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COMPETENCE TO REFUSE MEDICAL TREATMENT:
AUTONOMY VS. PATERNALISMt
by
George J. Annas* and Joan E. Densberger**
The right to refuse medical treatment is universally recognized as a
fundamental principle of liberty. Nonetheless, the right is often in-
fringed upon by paternalistic physicians who either use too narrow a
definition of competence, or misunderstand or ignore the patient's
liberty interest in freedom from coerced medical interventions. A
careful consideration of competence in the medical care setting leads
to a conclusion that it can best be assessed by determining the pa-
tient's ability to understand the information necessary to provide in-
formed consent to treatment. If a patient has this capacity, both his
consent and refusal must be honored. Placing competence determi-
nations squarely within the framework of the informed consent pro-
cess should help assure that the values of autonomy and rational
decisionmaking that informed consent is founded on are protected.
As an additional measure, the authors propose a Model Act which
clearly enunciates an individual's right to refuse treatment, does not
limit its exercise to the terminally ill or to heroic measures, and pro-
vides a mechanism by which individuals can set forth their wishes in
advance and designate another person to enforce them.
INTRODUCTION
C OMPETENT individuals are at liberty to make their own med-
ical treatment decisions; incompetent individuals are not. Thus,
competence and liberty are inextricably interwoven. Competence is
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broadly defined as the capacity to understand and appreciate the
nature and consequence of one's actions. The vagueness of this defi-
nition, coupled with the dearth of legal literature on the subject,
make competence determinations ripe for arbitrariness and pose a
danger to individual liberty.' A determination of incompetence, or
even a suspicion of it, can be used to justify paternalism by physi-
cians and family members.2
Perhaps the most famous example of the paternalistic approach
1. See Appelbaum & Roth, Patients Who Refuse Treatment in Medical Hospi-
tals, 250 J. A.M.A. 1296 (1983); Meisel, The 'Exceptions' to the Informed Consent
Doctrine: Striking a Balance Between Competing Values in Medical Decisionmak-
ing, 1979 Wisc. L. Rev. 413, 440; Green, Judicial Tests of Mental Incompetency, 6
Mo. L. REV. 141 (1941).
2. Strictly speaking, paternalism only applies to competent patients. Yet, the
vagueness of its definition can lead to individuals being incorrectly labeled as incom-
petent, and thus improperly having their decisions made by others. Paternalism has
been variously defined in legal and philosophical literature. Legal definitions tend to
concentrate exclusively on interference with an individual's liberty for his own good,
and that is how the term is used in this article. One commentator has written: "By
paternalism I shall understand roughly the interference with a person's liberty of ac-
tion justified by reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs,
interests, or values of the person being coerced." Dworkin, Paternalism, in MORALITY
AND THE LAW 107, 108 (R. Wasserstrom ed. 1971). Medical ethicists tend to. see the
concept as somewhat broader. For example, Allen Buchanan defines paternalism as
"interference with a person's freedom of action or freedom of information, or the
deliberate dissemination of misinformation, where the alleged justification of interfer-
ing or misinforming is that it is for the good of the person who is interfered with or
misinformed. Buchanan, Medical Paternalism, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 370, 372 (1978).
James Childress identifies two characteristics of a paternalistic act: the motivation
and intention is to prevent harm, and it involves a refusal to accept or to acquiese in
an individual's choices, wishes and actions. J. Childress, Paternalism and Health
Care, in MEDICAL RESPONSIBILITY 15, 18-19 (W. Robinson & M. Pritchard eds. 1979).
More broadly yet, Charles M. Culver and Bernard Gert list the following four charac-
teristics as defining paternalistic behavior:
A is acting paternalistically toward S if and only if (A's behavior correctly indi-
cates that A believes that):
1. his acting benefits S
2. his action involves violating a moral rule with regard to S
3. his action does not have S's past, present, or immediately forthcoming
consent
4. S is competent to give consent (simple or valid).
C. CULVER & B. GERT, PHILOSOPHY IN MEDICINE 130 (1982). In adopting Dworkin's
more narrow view in this article we do not mean to suggest that Culver and Gert are
not correct in widening liberty to include violation of any "moral rule," but only to
conclude that in the treatment refusal situation, liberty is properly the exclusive fo-
cus relating to paternalistic behavior. See also Gruzalski, When to Keep Patients
Alive Against Their Wishes, in VALUE CONFLICTS IN HEALTH CARE DECISIONS 171,
172-79 (B. Gruzalski & C. Nelson eds. 1982).
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occurred in the treatment of Dr. Barney Clark, the recipient of the
world's first artificial heart. Because he was so sick and so near
death, and because his surgeon, Dr. William DeVries, believed that
Clark really had no choice but to accept the artificial heart, the in-
formed consent process was incomplete and paternalistic. Instead of
focusing on the unprecedented experimental nature of the implant,
and planning for contingencies such as a "halfway success" with a
live, but permanently hospitalized and incompetent patient, Dr.
DeVries focused on the potential "therapeutic" aspects. This focus
not only deprived Dr. Clark of the information needed to give an
informed consent to the implant, but also deprived him of any op-
portunity to participate, either by prior decisions or naming a proxy,
in decisionmaking concerning the three major surgical procedures
performed after the initial implant.' Dr. DeVries has justified his
approach by arguing that, "He was too old for a transplant and
there were no drugs that would help; the only thing that he could
look forward to was dying."" The rhetoric was that only Barney
Clark could make this decision. The reality was that by ignoring sig-
nificant aspects of the procedure, and labelling it therapeutic experi-
mentation, Clark was treated as incompetent and the choice was
made for him.5
3. N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1983, § 1, at 44. (One on December 4, 1982 to correct air
leaks in lungs, one on December 14, 1982 to replace a cracked valve, and one on
January 14, 1983 because of nosebleeds.) The consent form he did sign had promised
him that only he would make the decisions to undergo such procedures; nevertheless,
they were all made for him because he was deemed incompetent:
2.2 1 further understand that additional chest surgeries may be required in
the event the device needs to be replaced or repaired which will be explained
to me and will be done with a new consent form signed by me for each such
procedure and that in all likelihood, general anesthesia with its attendant risks
would be necessary in connection with such procedures.
2.3 I also understand that the use of the artificial heart may necessitate addi-
tional instrumentation and studies in order that adequate information may be
obtained concerning its functioning, and such instrumentation and studies are
expected to consist of or be similar to those involved in cardiac catherization
but may include other procedures, with attendant risks, discomfort and incon-
venience. Each of these new procedures will have a consent form which must
be signed before they are performed (emphasis added).
4. NEWSWEEK, Dec. 13, 1982, 35-36.
5. Making the decision for experimental heart procedures on the basis that the
"doctor knows best" has strong historical precedents. Dr. Christiaan Barnard, who
performed the first human heart transplant in 1967, argued that his patient really
had no choice: "He was at the end of the line ... For a dying man it is not a difficult
decision ... If a lion chases you to the bank of a river filled with crocodiles, you will
leap into the water convinced you have a chance to swim to the other side. But you
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Although a discussion of rational suicide is beyond the scope of
this article, the case of Elizabeth Bouvia illustrates some of the
problems encountered in determining competence. Ms. Bouvia is a
twenty-six year old cerebral palsy victim who has suffered from her
disease since birth. She entered a hospital as-a potential suicide, and
later asked the staff to attend her while she refused all nutrition so
that she might die of starvation." In pursuit of this objective, she
sought a restraining order to prevent the hospital staff from force
feeding her. At the hearing, the testimony focused on her compe-
tence. While almost all of the physicians who testified found her
competent, all agreed that recent events such as her inability to find
employment, her financial problems, her separation from her hus-
band, and her inability to have a child contributed to her decision to
want to die.7 Questions concerning the effects of stress, depression,
physical impairments, and the "rationality" of a decision on a per-
son's competence were argued. The trial judge found that Ms.
Bouvia was mentally competent, but nonetheless refused to enjoin
the physicians at Riverside Hospital from force feeding her because
of the "profound effect" it would have on the doctors.8 This ex-
tremely complicated and controversial case demonstrates the confu-
sion surrounding the issues of when a determination of competence
is appropriate and on what basis it should be made, and even what
the consequences of a determination should be.
Most competence determinations, of course, are not front page
news. They are made routinely in our nation's hospitals and nursing
homes without fanfare or resort to the courts.9 In all cases, however,
what is at stake is that the right to make treatment decisions could
be transferred from the patient to some other person.
The right to consent to or refuse treatment, even in the extreme
case in which treatment might prolong life, tests the potency of our
conviction to take autonomy seriously. The advent of effective medi-
cal technologies to sustain life has made competence more critical
would never accept such odds if there were no lion." Likewise, Dr. Denton Cooley
argued about the first recipient of a temporary artificial heart, Haskell Karp, "He was
a drowning man. A drowning man cannot be too particular what he's going to use as a
life preserver." Annas, Consent to the Artificial Heart: The Lion and the Crocodiles,
13 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 20 (April, 1983).
6. Bouvia v. County of Riverside, No. 159780 (Super. Ct. Cal. Dec. 16, 1983).
7. See Transcript of Bouvia case, id. [hereinafter cited as Transcript].
8. Transcript at 1242-43.
9. See, e.g., Brown & Thompson, Nontreatment of Fever in Extended-Care Fa-
cilities, 300 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1246 (1979).
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because the stakes in decision-making are higher. Cases involving
refusals by patients and their surrogates of mechanical ventilators,
cancer chemotherapy, kidney dialysis, surgery, and nasogastric feed-
ing have all been litigated.'0
In Section I of this article, we briefly review the legal pedigree of
the right to consent to and refuse treatment. Section II deals with
the problems of determining competence. In Section III, we suggest
steps, including model legislation, to help promote and reaffirm the
principle of self-determination in the medical care setting.
I. THE RIGHT TO CONSENT TO AND REFUSE TREATMENT
A. Overview
The presumption of Anglo-American law is that every competent
adult is at liberty to consent to or refuse any proposed medical
treatment." When a physician's recommendation is refused, how-
ever, conflict becomes almost inevitable and its resolution is seldom
easy.'
2
The legal right to refuse treatment is part of the common law
right to self-determination.'I In the last twenty years, the right to
10. In re Earle Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980) (kidney dialysis);
Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (1978) (chemotherapy); Lane v.
Candura, 6 Mass. App. 377, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (1978) (surgery to remove gangrenous
leg); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976) (mechanical ventilator); In re
Conroy, 188 N.J. Super. 523, 457 A.2d 1232 (1983), rev'd, 190 N.J. Super. 453, 464
A.2d 303 (1983) (nasogastric feeding); Matter of Application of Plaza Health and Re-
habilitation Center, No. 84-1 Infancy (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Onodaga Cty Feb. 2, 1984)
(Miller, J.) (force feeding).
11. See generally G. GRISEZ, LiFe AND DEATH WITH LIBERTY AND JUSTICE 87-88
(1979).
12. Id. at 88-89.
13. Schloendorff v.Society Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914). In 1914, a
patient's right to self-determination was expressed in the Schloendorff case by Judge
Cardozo in which he stated that "[e]every human being of adult years and sound
mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body .. " Id. at 129,
105 N.E. at 93. Although Schloendorff has been hailed as a "celebrated case," (Presi-
dent's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical
and Behavioral Sciences, 1 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS 20 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as HEALTH CARE DECISIONS]) it is better seen as rhetoric. DICKENS, The Right to
a Natural Death, 26 McGILL L.J. 849 (1981). The right articulated by Judge Cardozo
was a qualified right and its exercise was predicated on a condition (sound mind)
which unfortunately left much room for ambiguity and varied interpretation. A better
enunciation of the right to refuse treatment based on self-determination can be found
in Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, _, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (1960). In Natanson, the
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refuse treatment has gained additional judicial recognition as a right
embodied in the constitutional right to privacy. 4 By enunciating .a
right to self-determination in matters of bodily integrity, in which
the right to refuse treatment is implicit, the law "intends to enclose
everyone in an invisible shield and to give each person the right to
decide when to lower the shield and when to keep it in place. ' "
The President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems
in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Sciences (President's
Commission) also has viewed self-determination as a shield "valued
for the freedom from outside control it is intended to provide.' 6 It
is a manifestation of the desire to be an instrument of one's own and
"not of other men's acts of will.' 7 "[S]elf-determination overrides
practitioner-determination even if providers [are] able to demon-
strate that they [can] accurately assess the treatment an informed
patient would choose."' 8 Courts around the country have upheld the
competent individual's freedom to make decisions regarding his own
medical care even if the potential outcome (often death) is not
viewed favorably by the courts.'
exercise of the right to refuse treatment was contingent upon the individual being of
"sound mind". The Court said in dictum:
Anglo-American law starts with the premise of thorough-going self-determina-
tion. It follows that each man is considered to be master of his own body and
he may, if he be of sound mind, expressly prohibit the performance of life-
saving surgery, or other medical treatment. A doctor might well believe that an
operation or form of treatment is desirable or necessary but the law does not
permit him to substitute his own judgment for that of the patient ...
14. In a series of decisions, the United States Supreme Court has tied the right
of control over one's body to the fundamental right of privacy. Thus, a person has a
right to use contraceptives free from state interference, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 485 (1965); to obtain an abortion from a willing physician in the first tri-
mester of pregnancy free from state interference, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163,
(1973); and to seek abortion services without permission of a parent or spouse,
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 58 (1976).
15. G. GRISEz, supra note 11, at 88 (emphasis supplied).
16. HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 13, at 45.
17. I. BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 138
(1969), quoted in HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 13, at 45.
18. See HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 13, at 45.
19. See Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), aff'd 379
So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); In re Estate of Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965);
In re Quakenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282, 383 A.2d 785 (1978); Erickson v. Dilgard, 44
Misc. 2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Sup. Ct. 1962). Cf. Judge Hews in Bouvia, "We all
earnestly hope that this young woman will realize that there is hope in life and that
now because of the action taken by her she can be a symbol of hope to others simi-
larly situated if she changes her purpose." Bouvia v. County of Riverside, No. 159780
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The right to refuse treatment also has been characterized as an
aspect of the right to privacy implicit in the liberty provisions of the
United States Constitution. In Whalen v. Roe, Justice Stevens sug-
gested that the right encompassed something beyond the least com-
mon denominator of the Court's prior decisions with respect to mar-
ital choice, procreation, contraception, and child rearing, and
embraced both a general "individual interest in avoiding disclosure
of personal matters" and distinct "interest in independence in mak-
ing certain kinds of important decisions. '20 The two leading right
to refuse treatment cases from the state courts also have relied
heavily on the constitutional right to privacy in upholding the right
of a patient to refuse life-sustaining treatment. In the case of Karen
Ann Quinlan, the New Jersey Supreme Court focused on the consti-
tutional right of privacy in its analysis.21 The Quinlan court con-
cluded that "presumably this right is broad enough to encompass a
patient's decision to decline medical treatment under certain cir-
cumstances, in much the same way as it is broad enough to encom-
pass a women's decision to terminate pregnancy under certain cir-
cumstances. '22 In Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 23
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court rejected the state's argu-
ment that permitting patients to refuse life saving treatment would
undermine the state's legitimate interest in protecting the "value of
life." The court stated that:
The constitutional right to privacy, as we conceive it, is an expression
of the sanctity of individual free choice and self-determination as fun-
damental constituents of life. The value of life as so perceived is less-
ened not by a decision to refuse treatment, but by the failure to allow
a competent human being the right of choice.
2 4
B. The Role of Competence
Although the right to refuse treatment is a legally and ethically
recognized right, the ability to exercise it in the hospital remains
(Super. Ct. Cal. Dec. 16, 1983).
20. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 596 (1977) (emphasis supplied).
21. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 38, 355 A. 2d 647, 662 (1976), cert. denied sub
nor., Garger v. N.J., 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
22. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663.
23. Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, - Mass. -, 370 N.E.2d 417
(1977).
24. Id. at -, 370 NE.2d at 426 (emphasis supplied).
Winter 19841
TOLEDO LAW REVIEW
problematic since only competent individuals have this right and
the determination of competence is uncertain. Competence is the
crucial issue since a lack of competence, or even the questioning of
an individual's competence, deprives the individual of the liberty to
make treatment decisions.
2 5
The quality of consent is determined by examining four charac-
teristics: voluntariness, competence, information, and understand-
ing.2 6 Although the courts have not explicitly required understand-
ing as an element in making disclosures in the informed consent
process, we believe that a proper definition of competence makes the
understanding requirement implicit in informed consent. Compe-
tence is a capacity, but the most meaningful way to test for compe-
tence in a particular situation is to determine if the patient actually
understood the information necessary to provide "informed" con-
sent. If he did, he obviously had the capacity to understand it.
C. Informed Consent and Competence
The informed consent doctrine requires that a patient be given
material information, information that might influence a patient's
decision, including information about his condition, the proposed
treatment, including its risks and benefits, and its alternatives. Im-
plemented in good faith by the physician, informed consent en-
hances both self-determination and rational decision-making.27 It is
assumed that an informed patient has sufficient information on
which to base a decision to accept or reject proposed treatment.2 8
Thus, it is important to assess the patient's capability to understand
and appreciate the information disclosed so that we can be confident
it is his decision when he makes it.
Infants and comatose patients provide clear examples of patients
who are incapable of making decisions regarding medical care. There
are equally obvious cases where the patient is capable of making
such decisions. Unfortunately, there are also many borderline or
gray cases from the perspective of the physician, who wants both to
honor the patient's wishes (respect autonomy) and deliver good
25. Legal Advisers, Concern for Dying, The Right to Refuse Treatment: A Model
Act, 73 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 919 (1983).
26. G. ANNAS, L. GLANTZ & B. KATZ, INFORMED CONSENT TO HUMAN EXPERIMEN-
TATION: THE SUBJECT'S DILEMMA 53 (1977) [hereinafter cited as HUMAN
EXPERIMENTATION].
27. Id. at 33-38.
28. Id. at 29-31.
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medical care (promote the patients' well-being), when these two
objectives seem to conflict.2" These are often cases in which the ca-
pacity of the patient to participate in the medical decision-making
process appears questionable or where the physician believes that
the patient's refusal is not authentic but is instead a product of psy-
chological, sociological, and perhaps, economic factors.30 Such cases
are dealt with in a variety of ways with varying degrees of arbitrari-
ness, including sincere attempts to determine patient competence
objectively.31 At issue in all of these cases is the freedom of the indi-
vidual to exercise the right to refuse treatment and accept the con-
sequences of his own decision. To minimize arbitrariness and avoid
imposing our values on those who may not share them, we must
carefully consider when undertaking a determination of competence
is warranted and how the determination shall be made.
II. PROBLEMS OF DETERMINING COMPETENCE
A. Approaches to Competence
A variety of approaches have been suggested to determine com-
petence. The President's Commission identified three: outcome, sta-
tus, and function. Under the Outcome Approach, decisions which do
not reflect community values are used as evidence of incompetence.
Under the Status Approach, an individual's competence is based on
his physical or mental status (i.e., consciousness, age, mental or
physical diagnosis). The Functioning Approach focuses on the indi-
29. Gruzalski, supra note 2, at 171. And see examples in Jackson & Young, Pa-
tient Autonomy and Death With Dignity, 30 NEW ENG. J. MED. 404 (1979).
30. For a good discussion with illustrations of difficult cases see Rodin, et al.,
Stopping Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment: Psychiatric Considerations in the
Termination of Renal Dialysis, 26 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 37 (1981).
31. Two psychiatrists have stated that
involuntary treatment of patients deemed by the staff to be incompetent was a
common practice. It should be noted that the staff in several of the hospitals
studied appeared to have a uniform rule of thumb to determine competency,
namely that a patient be disoriented and incoherent. . . . Once a patient fell
into this category, he or she was often restrained (using arm and leg restraints
and "Posey" vests), treated with sedative and antipsychotic medication to con-
trol disruptive or annoying behavior (e.g. loud screaming), and given whatever
treatment short of surgery or intrusive diagnostic procedures (generally classi-
fied as those that would require anesthesia), the physicians deemed necessary.
Appelbaum & Roth, Treatment Refusal in Medical Hospitals, in 2 HEALTH CARE
DECISIONS, supra note 13, at 474, app. D (emphasis added).
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vidual's actual functioning in decision-making situations.3 2
Most commentators have assumed that the functioning approach
is the correct approach, and have tried to better define the attrib-
utes needed to function competently. One philosopher has sug-
gested, for example, that we can require any one of four increasingly
strict standards: (1) free action, which involves a voluntary and in-
tentional choice; (2) authentic decision, which is a decision that re-
flects the individual's values; (3) effective deliberation, which is an
evaluation of the specific alternatives and their consequences; and
(4) moral reflection, which is, in addition to effective deliberation,
reflection on and acceptance of the moral values upon which the de-
cision is based.3  Two psychiatrists have used an analogous classifi-
cation of increasingly difficult tests and suggested the following four
possible tests: (1) evidencing a choice; (2) evidencing an understand-
ing of relevant issues; (3) rationally manipulating the relevant infor-
mation; and (4) in addition to (2) and (3), an appreciation of the
nature of the situation. 34 In their words, "[a]ppreciation is distinct
from factual understanding in that it requires the subject to con-
sider the relevance to his immediate situation of those facts he has
understood previously in the abstract."3 5 The authors regard this as
the "strictest" standard; we also believe it is the most reasonable
one and, if fairly applied, the one that is most appropriate in hospi-
tal and nursing home settings. This type of "functioning" approach,
as recommended by the President's Commission, avoids the pitfalls
of second-guessing an individual's personality implicit in the au-
thentic decision and moral reflection test. The functioning approach
also helps insure that the decision the patient makes is one he real-
izes will have consequences for himself. In addition, the test has a
solid legal pedigree in the context of treatment refusals.3 6
The appreciation test of competence is, for example, used by the
Massachusetts Court of Appeals in Lane v. Candura.3 7 Mrs.
Candura was a 77-year old widow and a diabetic who was suffering
from gangrene in the right foot and lower leg. She had undergone
two previous amputations (a toe and a portion of her right foot) and
32. HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 13, at 170.
33. Miller, Autonomy and the Refusal of Lifesaving Treatment, 11 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 22, 27 (Aug. 1981).
34. APPELBAUM & ROTH, COMPETENCY TO CONSENT TO TREATMENT (1977).
35. Id. at 954.
36. See supra notes 10 and 19.
37. Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (1978).
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at the time of the second amputation, an arterial bypass had been
performed in an attempt to decrease the probability of recurrences
of gangrene. Her attending physicians recommended that the leg be
amputated without delay. After some vacillation, she refused the op-
eration and persisted in that refusal. The trial court held that Mrs.
Candura was "incapable of making a rational and competent choice
to undergo or reject the proposed surgery to her right leg. To this
extent her behavior is irrational. She has closed her mind to the en-
tire issue to the extent that the court cannot conclude that her deci-
sion to reject further treatment is rational and informed ... 38
The trial court concentrated on the fact that she had "closed her
mind" and thus seemed to focus on "autonomy as effective delibera-
tion:" Ultimately, however, this appears to have been less important
to the trial court than her actual decision which the court character-
ized as "irrational", thus falling into the "outcome approach" trap.3 9
The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, concentrated on her abil-
ity to "appreciate" her situation and its alternatives. The court re-
versed the trial court's decision and stated that "Mrs. Candura's de-
cision may be regarded by most as unfortunate but on the record in
this case it is not the uninformed decision of a person incapable of
appreciating the nature and consequences of her act."
40
The court of appeals noted that "[u]ntil she changed her original
decision and withdrew her consent to the amputation, her compe-
tence was not questioned. '41 The doctors readily accepted her con-
sent to the two initial amputations, and only questioned it when she
disagreed with their judgment about her treatment. The court made
it clear that competence is not to be judged by a standard of medi-
38. Id. at 379, 376 N.E.2d at 1233.
39. At least two of the physicians who testified in the Bouvia case fell into the
"outcome" trap. See Bouvia v. County of Riverside, No. 159780 (Super. Ct. Cal. Dec.
16, 1983). The chief of psychiatry at the hospital, Dr. Donald E. Fisher, testified that
Ms. Bouvia's decision not to accept food was a "bad decision," "impaired," and one
that he would not honor. Dr. Fisher was asked if Elizabeth Bouvia had changed her
mind and decided to eat, would that decision be a "competent health care decision on
her part." The doctor responded, "I think it would be." Transcript, supra note 7, at
590. More generally, Dr. Thomas M. Heric, called by the petitioner, testified: "Doc-
tors like patients to agree with them. When a patient agrees with me, the patient is
rational. When an 80 year old lady refuses to have a massive resection of her bowel
for wide-spread cancer, then I send her to a psychiatrist, because she is not agreeing
with me, so she is irrational." Id. at 1021.
40. Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. at -, 376 N.E.2d at 1236 (emphasis
added).
41. Id. at -, 376 N.E.2d at 1235.
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cal rationality, that is, what her physicians consider the only reason-
able decision. Instead, the court pointed out that the relevant fac-
tors were her understanding of the "proposed operation" and the
consequences of refusing it. According to the court, "[Mrs. Candura]
has made it clear that she does not wish to have the operation even
though that decision will in all likelihood lead shortly to her
death."'42
This test of competence (the capacity to understand and appreci-
ate the nature and consequences of one's acts) has been used by
other courts in similar circumstances, and is probably the most pre-
cise concept of competence that we will be able to develop."3 It can
be restated in the medical care context by saying that if an individ-
ual understands and appreciates the information needed to give an
informed consent, then that individual is competent to give both an
informed consent and to refuse consent. We support use of this test
because its content will vary with the actual treatment decision, and
the risks and alternatives tha face the patient, but not with the sta-
tus of the patient or the decision made by the patient. This func-
tional test is also the one used to determine if a minor is "mature"
enough to consent to medical care." This is appropriate since it
avoids the use of a "status approach" and places primary emphasis
on the minor's functional ability to make the specific treatment
decision.
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972); In re Quackenbush, 156
N.J. Super. 282, 383 A.2d 785 (Morris County Ct. 1978); In re Melideo, 88 Misc. 2d
974, 390 N.Y.S.2d 523 (Sup. Ct. 1976); In re Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C.2d 619 (C.P. of
Northampton County 1973). The requirements of "understanding and appreciating"
cut across other areas of legal competence determinations. The two terms are also
used together in determining the capacity necessary to enter into a contract. 2 BLACK,
RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION at 735 (2d ed. 1929). See also discussion in Green,
supra note 1, at 147-52. While these terms can be criticized as vague, they are given
meaning by the specific context in which they are used. In contracts, for example, by
the nature of the particular transaction and its consequences; in wills, by the nature
and extent of the property involved and the individual's relationships with others;
and in the case of refusing treatment, with the elements necessary to give or withhold
an informed consent. The degree of understanding and appreciation may vary from
case to case, just as the degree of bodily invasion varies. In an analogous situation,
the "reasonable degree of rational understanding" needed to be found competent to
stand trial will "vary from the charge of petty theft to a charge of murder or kidnap-
ping." Annas, Book Review, 54 B.U.L. REV. 863, 866 (1974).
44. See discussion, HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION, supra note 26, at 70-73.
[Vol. 15
Winter 1984] MEDICAL TREATMENT
B. When Competence is Questioned
Use of the "outcome approach" by physicians, as in the Candura
case, is probably the rule rather than the exception: competence is
typically questioned only when a patient refuses to consent to a rec-
ommended treatment.45 Testimony before the President's Commis-
sion is consistent with this view: "coherent adults are seldom said to
lack capacity (except, perhaps, in the mental health context) when
they acquiesce in the course of treatment recommended by their
physician."4
Without a specific, consistent basis for questioning and deter-
mining competence, the patient's reason for refusal, an easily identi-
fiable target for criticism, can too easily become justification for pa-
ternalism. Thus, there may be a substitution of the physician's own
judgment and values for those of the patient, including the physi-
cian's conception of a "good" or "bad" reason. The physician may
also attempt to establish a cause-effect relationship between some
kind of mental or physical factor (e.g., depression or blood loss) and
the undesirable decision, thus enabling him to invalidate that deci-
sion on "medical" grounds and to proceed with his own decision.
4 7
45. See supra note 39.
46. HEALTH CARE DEcisIoNs, supra note 13, at 61. See also C. CULVER & B. GERT,
supra note 2, at 61; Meisel, supra note 1, at 451.
47. See Starkman & Young, Evaluation and Management of the Patient Who
Refuses Medical Care, 6 PRIMARY CARE (1979); see also, e.g., Lane v. Candura, 6
Mass. App. Ct. 377, -, 376 N.E.2d 1232, 1235 (1978); Meisel, supra note 1, at 446-
47. We agree with those who argue that paternalism is never a justification for impos-
ing treatment on a competent patient. On the other hand, we recognize that there
may be extremely unusual circumstances which to many would justify paternalistic
behavior for brief periods of time, and that focusing on the definition of "compe-
tence" rather than the elements justifying paternalism may simply be a smokescreen.
For example, C. CULVER & B. GERT, supra note 2, specify three (and only three)
factors that are relevant to justifying a paternalistic intervention:
1. The moral rule(s) which is (are) violated;
2. The probable amount of evil caused, avoided, or ameliorated by the moral
rule violation (probable amount includes the kind and severity of the evil, the
likelihood that the evil will occur, and the probable length of time it will be
suffered);
3. The rational desires of the person(s) affected by the moral rule violation.
Id. at 148.
Culver & Gert argue further that to justify paternalistic behavior we must be pre-
pared to publicly advocate that the violation be universal; "that it would be irrational
for S not to choose having the rule violated with regard to himself." More specifically,
to be strongly justified, all rational persons must be prepared to agree "that the evil
prevented by universally allowing the violation would be greater than the evil caused
by universally allowing [the evil caused by permitting liberty]." Id. at 149. One exam-
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Second-guessing a competent patient's decision by questioning the
reasons for refusal is unjustified paternalism, as is labelling a person
incompetent because of his stated reasons for refusing treatment.
C. Fact or Value Question?
Competence is viewed legally as a question of fact. In Grannum
v. Berard, for example, the Washington Supreme Court stated that
"[tihe mental capacity necessary to consent to a surgical operation
is a question of fact to be determined from the circumstances of
each individual case."48 In Candura, "[tihe principal question [was]
whether the facts established by the evidence [justified] a conclusion
of legal incompetence." '4 9 Some physicians have erroneously con-
ple the authors use may be helpful. They cite the example of Dax Cowart (who they
identify only as Mr. L), the 26-year-old Texan who was badly burned over more than
65% of his body and for more than 9 months had undergone a variety of procedures
and operations. He was also subjected to very painful daily "tankings" that involved
being placed in a tub of antibacterial solution to prevent skin infection. He has previ-
ously objected to these treatments, and now clearly states he no longer can stand the
pain of the treatments, does not believe his outcome will be acceptable to him, and
wants the tankings stopped. We agree with the authors that to continue treatment
over Mr. Cowart's competent objections is unjustifiable paternalism. Using their own
test they concluded that "[n]o rational person would publicly advocate this kind of
violation because of the terrible consequences of living in a world where great pain
could be inflicted on persons against their rational desires whenever some other per-
son could do so by appealing to some different rational ranking of evils of his own."
Id. at 152-53. On the other hand, what if Dax Cowart had only to undergo one week
of painful tankings to be returned to an essentially normal life? Under these circum-
stances to prefer death might be labelled "irrational." The authors conclude that the
physicians would be justified in acting paternalistically and treating the patient for a
week over his objections, since "a rational person could publicly advocate this kind of
violation" on a universal basis. Id. at 154. This example, of course, raises the question
of where and how one draws the line between a day, a week, a month, etc. of forced
treatment and helps underline the subjectivity involved in making such a decision.
Our own position is that one can continue treatment during a competence assess-
ment, but if competence is established, no further treatment of the patient is permis-
sible even though death would result, since we believe that the violation of liberty is
far more serious an evil than apparently do Culver and Gert. The case of Dax Cowart
is a well-known teaching case because of a videotape made of his treatment refusal in
1974 by the University of Texas Medical Branch in Galveston called "Please Let Me
Die." Concern for Dying is currently producing an hour-long documentary of Mr.
Cowart's medical treatment and subsequent recovery, which will be aired later in
1984.
48. Grannum v. Berard, 70 Wash.2d 304, -, 422 P.2d 812, 814 (1967); see G.
ANNAS, L. GLANTZ, & B. KATZ, THE RIGHTS OF DOCTORS, NURSES, AND ALLIED HEALTH
PROFESSIONALS at 80-82 (1981).
49. Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, -, 376 N.E.2d 1232, 1235 (1978).
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cluded that "[t]he law has tended to address competency as a fixed
attribute of an individual, a characteristic in itself with an inherent
stability."50 On the contrary, courts recognize that competence can
change from day to day, and have done a remarkable job of consid-
ering all of the patient's characteristics in making what in law must
be a yes or no decision at a particular point in time. Physicians are
surely correct in asserting a continuum of competence. Yet, this does
not answer the basic question of whether a particular patient is to
lose the liberty to make his or her own decision about a particular
treatment. Ultimately, the decision by both courts and physicians is
likely to be based upon a value judgment. In the words of Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes: "General propositions do not decide con-
crete cases. The decision will depend on a judgment or intuition
more subtle than any articulate major premise." 51
It is often difficult to separate objectivity in determining the rel-
evant facts from subjectivity in the imposition of values in a compe-
tence determination. What should be considered a fact question,
that is, whether a person is capable of understanding and appreciat-
ing the nature and consequences of his actions, can be transformed
into a value question focusing on the reasonableness of the patient's
decision. The criteria on which competence determinations are made
in both law and medicine can be seen as a fact and value hybrid, the
value aspects comprised of the competing values held by the patient,
family, staff, and state. Of these, the patient's values must be deter-
minative to protect liberty.
A more fundamental distinction between adjudication of compe-
tence in law and a competence determination in medicine is the pre-
sumption of competence. The legal rule is that competence is pre-
sumed. All proceedings to test the competence of a person to
perform a certain act begin with a presumption of competence
which continues unless the contrary is shown. The burden of proof
is on the individual contesting competence.52 Moreover, a person
who is incompetent to function responsibly in one context may be
50. Roth & Appelbaum, Clinical Issues in the Assessment of Competency, 138
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1462, 1466 (1981).
51. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (dissent), quoted with approval
in Green, Public Policies Underlying the Law of Mental Incompetency, 38 MICH. L.
REV. 1189, 1221 (1940) (competence determination context); see also supra notes 37-
43 and accompanying text. See also Meisel, supra note 1, at 452.
52. It has been suggested that it is therefore more appropriate to adopt the term
"incompetence" determination, since this is what must be proven to deprive the pa-
tient of autonomy. Meisel, supra note 1, at 442 n.104.
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competent in others.5 3 In medicine, however, the prevailing supposi-
tion is often presumption of incompetence. Medical skepticism of
patients' capacities for self-determination can be traced to the time
of Hippocrates, who advised fellow practitioners to:
Perform [these duties] calmly and adroitly, concealing most things
from the patient while you are attending to him. Give necessary or-
ders with cheerfulness and sincerity, turning his attention away from
what is being done to him; sometimes reprove sharply and emphati-
cally, and sometimes comfort with solicitude and attention, revealing
nothing of the patient's future or present condition. 4
Jay Katz noted that "Hippocrates . . . recommended this pos-
ture to physicians because he doubted patients' capacity for self-de-
termination." 55 These attitudes were reflected in professional codes
of ethics throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
and continue to be reflected in practice today. 6
We must guard against physicians who presume patient incom-
petence. Education may be the long term solution. More immedi-
ately, however, it seems desirable to agree on a simple competence
assessment test that can be administered at the bedside. Such a test,
if based on "understanding and appreciation" and not on any tech-
nical medical or psychiatric judgment, should be usable by any rea-
sonable person, including a family member or physician. Its exis-
53. See also Green, supra note 1, at 158-59. Compare In re Holloway's Estate,
195 Cal. 711, 733, 235 P. 1012, 1021 (1925) with Faber v. Sweet Style Mfg. Co., 40
Misc. 2d 212, 216, 242 N.Y.S.2d 763, 768 (1963) (less mental capacity needed to make
a will than a contract).
54. Hippocrates, Decorum, in 2 HIPPOCRATES 297, 299 (W. Jones trans. 2d ed.
1967).
55. Katz, Disclosure and Consent: In Search of Their Roots, in GENETICS AND
THE LAW 11 124 (A. Milunsky & G. Annas eds. 1980).
56. See id. at 123-24. Perhaps the most pervasive justification voiced for the
"doctor knows best" attitude is the "thank you theory", i.e., the patient will later
thank the doctor for ignoring his refusal. This justification has no basis, and, as Cul-
ver and Gert have stated, is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition to justify
paternalism. As they note, the patient may either be a "grudging person" who never
thanks anyone for anything, or one who is very obesiant toward physicians, and thus
forgives and thanks them for everything. In the first instance thanks is not necessary
to justify paternalism, and in the second it is insufficient. As the authors correctly
note, "one must ask where the judgments about whether one will later be thanked
come from." C. CULVER & B. GERT, supra note 2, at 161. The characteristics that lead




tence will enhance patient autonomy to the degree that its use
changes the physicians' attitudes in the direction of greater appreci-
ation of patients' decision-making capacity.
D. Determining Competence
The President's Commission recommended that for the sake of
"consistency and accuracy" and for the "protection of the right to
self-determination" that health care professionals and institutions
"develop clear policies to assess incompetence. '57 The Commission,
however, did not offer much guidance as to how such policies should
be developed or what they should be beyond advising that such de-
terminations should generally be made at the bedside and that "rou-
tine recourse to the courts" should be avoided.' s Although we do not
wish to delineate precise policies, it is our hope that the following
suggestions will be helpful in the development of methodologies for
assessing competence.
A competence determination requires substantive criteria and
procedural rules. Both aspects of the determination are important.
The substantive criteria have special significance, however, because
if they are unsound, the validity of the determination will be suspect
regardless of the fairness of the procedures employed. In determin-
ing whether or not the individual understands and appreciates the
nature and consequences of the proposed consent or refusal, we be-
lieve physicians will find that asking the patient the following ques-
tions will be useful in making an objective determination provided
that the patient has received the information needed to give an in-
formed consent:
1. What is your present physical condition?
2. What is the treatment that is being recommended for you?
3. What do you and your doctor think might happen to you if you
decide to accept the treatment? [This could be modified in appropri-
ate circumstances to ask specifically about risks involved in the treat-
ment, including those of most concern to the patient.]
4. What do you and your doctor think might happen to you if you
decide not to accept the recommended treatment?
5. What are the alternative treatments available (including no treat-
ment) and what are the probable consequences of accepting each?
57. HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 13, at 173.
58. Id. at 175.
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Competence rests ultimately on an ability or capacity to under-
stand and appreciate the nature and consequences of one's decision.
It seems appropriate to test this ability in the medical care setting
by using a basic informed consent interview. In this interview, one
would carefully explain the nature of the proposed treatment, its
likely risks and benefits, the alternatives (including no treatment)
and their risks and benefits, and ideally before the patient is asked
to consent, make a determination as to whether or not the patient
actually understands this basic information. By making the compe-
tence determination before asking for consent, one avoids the "out-
come approach" pitfall of labelling a patient incompetent on the ba-
sis of the patient's refusal. 9
There are, of course, complicating factors. A patient who vacil-
lates poses a problem to the physician attempting to discern what
the patient wants. What is at stake in vacillation, however, is not
incompetence, but indecisiveness. In cases where treatment is imme-
diately necessary to sustain life or prevent serious harm, reasonable
treatments can be performed to promote society's interest in health
without significantly undercutting the patient's liberty interest,
59. Each case should, of course, be considered independently. However, as in
law, although each competence determination should be pursued on a case-by-case
basis, precedents should be established so that there are some principles to follow to
assure greater equity and consistency in competence determinations. One author has
succinctly stated the importance of establishing principles in competence determina-
tions which will serve to guide succeeding cases:
Unless a decision about how to proceed in such a case is grounded on some
relatively clear rationale, it may be only the product of that day's psychological
outlook of the care provider, psychiatrist, hospital counsel, judge, or Institu-
tional Review Board member whose opinion became decisive .... Because the
case-by-case strategy [as thought of by the medical profession] is of itself
empty of content, it may lull care providers, however well-intentioned they
may be, into acting on the basis of values not shared by the patient.
Gruzalski, supra note 2, at 174-75. Cf. Rabkin, Gillerman & Rice, Orders Not To
Resuscitate, 295 NEw ENG. J. MED 364 (1976) (recommending that the mental com-
petence of patients to make decisions about their treatment be assessed on an ongo-
ing basis). We believe respect for the individual's liberty demands that a competence
determination be kept as narrow as possible and on point with the ability to perform
the immediate task at hand; the ability to make a decision in a particular instance.
We do, however, find reasonable the approach suggested by Roth and Appelbaum.
They assert that
[tihe magnitude of the intrusion on a patient's autonomy that is represented
by the consequences of a finding of incompetency and the impact of allowing a
competent patient to refuse potentially life-saving treatment both argue for a
cautious approach to evaluation of competency, represented by at least two
contacts with the patient on at least two different days.
Roth & Appelbaum, supra note 50, at 1465.
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since the patient has made no decision. 0
If a question persists in a nonemergent situation, treatment can-
not be forced until a determination is made (either at the bedside or
in court) that the patient is incompetent to make the decision re-
garding his care in the specific instance and a proxy named to act
for the patient."1
60. E.g., Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, _, 36 N.E.2d 1232, 1236 (1978)
where the court stated "the fact that she has vacillated in her resolve not to submit to
the operation does not justify a conclusion that her capacity to make the decision is
impaired to the point of legal incompetence." Id.
In a case in the medical literature, a patient in a Medical Intensive Care Unit with
a history of chronic obstructive lung disease was placed permanently on mechanical
ventilation. The patient subsequently experienced "striking changes of mind almost
daily" concerning his medical care and whether or not "he wanted maximal therapy."
The staff evidenced great disagreement about which side of the patient's ambivalence
to honor. Ultimately, when the patient developed a nosocomial pulmonary infection
and experienced ventricular fibrillations, no efforts were made at cardiopulmonary
resusciation. In this case, the care givers never really knew what the patient wanted,
since the patient had never made a clear decision. Continued treatment under these
circumstances was certainly warranted, but the decision not to resuscitate seems
problematic since there appears to have been no clear rationale for the decision. Jack-
son & Younger, supra note 29, at 405 (Case 1). When a patient is incompetent to
make a decision, however, immediate steps should be taken to appoint a proxy deci-
sion-maker unless competence is likely to return before a treatment decision is re-
quired. Cf. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972):
[A] person charged by a State with a criminal offense who is committed solely
on account of his incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be held more than the
reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substan-
tial probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future. If
it is determined that this is not the case, then the State must either institute
the customary civil commitment proceeding that would be required to commit
indefinitely any other citizen, or release the defendant.
Id. at 738 (emphasis added).
61. The case of Elizabeth Bouvia illustrates what should not happen. The chief
of psychiatry of Riverside General Hospital indicated that he would not honor her
request not to be force fed unless she had "at least a six month history of virtual
freedom from trouble." Bouvia v. County of Riverside, No. 159780 (Super. Ct. Cal.
Dec. 16, 1983). See Transcript, supra note 7, at 596-97. In her case, such a require-
ment would have been virtually impossible to ever fulfill and would amount simply to
a refusal to honor the patient's wishes. A useful comparison is the case of severely
burned patients where survival with maximal treatment is unprecedented. A decision
regarding "heroic" treatment can only be made with the patient's input it if is made
very soon after the burn, and before massive doses of pain medication are required.
Even under these extremely intense circumstances, 21 of 24 patients (or their families
in cases where the patient was comatose or brain-injured) chose nonheroic care after
being fully informed of their condition and options. Imbus & Zawacki, Autonomy for
Burned Patients When Survival is Unprecedented, 297 NEw ENG. J. MED. 308, 309
(1977). We, of course, believe all burned patients should be given such an option. The
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Another potential complicating factor is mental illness. The exis-
tence of mental illness does not always constitute incompetence, al-
though it may.62 A case in which mental illness would cause incom-
petence is one in which the illness itself prevents the patient from
understanding and appreciating the nature and consequences of his
decision. For example, a delusional patient who is being treated for
pulmonary abscess and refuses to have bronchoscopic drainage of
his lesion because he believes he has no lung problems at all, but is
convinced he has some foreign matter stuck in his nose, might prop-
erly be considered incompetent to refuse treatment. 3
study indicates, however, how well informed consent and informed refusals can work
when the medical staff go out of their way to insure patient autonomy.
62. See, e.g., In re Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C. 619 (C.P. of Northampton County
1973). Nor does temporary distortion of the patient's ability to choose because of
pain, medication or a metabolic abnormality determine incompetency. Roth & Appel-
baum, supra note 50, at 1465. "Competency is not necessarily a fixed state that can
be assessed with equivalent results at any one of a number of times. . . . Whenever
the assessment of competency is being conducted in a nonemergency setting, more
than one evaluation session should take place." Id.; see also J. ROBERTSON, THE
RIGHTS OF THE CRITICALLY ILL 42 (1983).
63. The case is described in Appelbaum & Roth, Treatment Refusal in Medical
Hospitals, in 2 HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 13, at 411, 432 app. D. The pa-
tient was not treated and died shortly thereafter. Apparently no attempt was made to
determine his competence. This is what older legal cases referred to as the "insane
delusion test." Specifically, to invalidate a contract or will it was insufficient that the
maker was suffering from an insane delusion: the delusion had to be one that was
"intimately related to the subject matter of the contract" or will. In contracts, for
example, the question was whether the transaction was motivated by the delusion. If
it was, the contract could be voided. Green, supra note 1, at 151. Similarly, an insane
delusion invalidates a will because it serves as improper motivation in its making. In
one case, for example, the insane belief which arose before the testator's death that
his wife had been unfaithful to him, and which led him to disinherit her, was suffi-
cient to set aside the will. In re Honigman's Will, 8 N.Y.2d 244, 168 N.E.2d 676, 203
N.Y.S.2d 859 (1960). As applied to treatment refusals, delusions would only serve to
make one incompetent to refuse treatment if they were the motivating factor behind
the refusal, for example, if the patient thought he was immortal and thus would not
die no matter what treatment he refused. Even if some of one's reasons for refusal are
delusional, this still may not be sufficient to invalidate one's decision. For example,
the fact that an elderly woman stated that one of her reasons for refusing an opera-
tion for breast cancer was that it would affect her ability to have babies and prohibit
a movie career was insufficient to overcome her refusal because there was an indepen-
dent and consistent reason voiced by her for the refusal: her fear that she would die if
the surgery was performed. The court refused to overrule her decision simply because
"some of her present reasons for refusal are delusional and the result of mental ill-
ness." In re Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C. 619, 624 (C.P. of Northampton County 1973).
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E. The Role of the Psychiatrist
Psychiatric evaluation of treatment refusals probably does not
occur as frequently as it should. In the only study of treatment re-
fusals in general hospitals, for example, it was found that out of 105
patients who refused treatment, only seven were seen by psychia-
trists as a result. All of these were cases in which the patient had a
past psychiatric history or was overtly depressed or psychotic."" On
the other hand, when a psychiatrist is called, the purpose is almost
always to have the patient declared incompetent so that treatment
can be given over the patient's refusal. Accordingly, it is critical that
the consulting psychiatrist have a good understanding of the limits
of his or her role in this situation. The psychiatrist should concen-
trate on making a competence determination, not treating the pa-
tient. To avoid drawing inferences colored by his own values, 5 the
psychiatrist should make a determination as to the presence or ab-
sence of mental disease. If a mental disease or illness is found, he
should ask if it interferes with the patient's ability to make a deci-
sion. Approaches to the patient may vary, but the substantive test
the psychiatrist applies should be one that first identifies (with the
help of hospital counsel if necessary) the information needed for the
patient to give an informed consent, and then determines the pa-
tient's understanding and appreciation of this information.
At the outset, the psychiatrist should determine, "What's going
on here?" Who is challenging the patient's capacity for decision-
making in a particular case? Is it the family? the physician? the
nursing staff?. In some cases it will be appropriate for the psychia-
trist to interview the challenger to discover the motivation behind
the action. This approach might exhume an underlying problem or
tension which had previously been undisclosed or simply gone unno-
ticed by others. The psychiatrist must also decide for whom he or
she is acting as an agent. Is it the hospital? the physician? the pa-
64. Appelbaum & Roth, supra note 1, at 1300.
65. See, e.g., discussion of the court in Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377,
-, 376 N.E.2d 1232, 1235 (1978).
[The psychiatrist's opinion] appears to have been based upon (1) his inference
from her unwillingness to discuss the problem with him that she was unable to
face up to the problem or to understand that her refusal constituted a choice;
(2) his characterization of "an unwillingness for whatever reason to consent to
life saving treatment . . . as suicidal;" and (3) a possibility, not established by
evidence as a reasonable probability, that her mind might be impaired by tox-
icity caused by the gangrenous condition.
Id. at __, 376 N.E.2d at 1235.
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tient?6 a It seems likely that the approach and findings of a psychia-
trist genuinely acting on behalf of the patient with only the patient's
interests in mind would differ from the psychiatrist acting on behalf
of a colleague when asked to examine a "troublesome" patient.
The limited amount of literature on treatment refusals has
placed a heavy emphasis on the difficulties of dealing with a pa-
tient's "transient feelings of despair and hopelessness" and feeling
of depression. 7 Physicians may improperly view a person's mood as
a justification to treat without consent on the grounds that it will
pass and the patient will change his mind."" Many have also argued
that seriously injured persons, such as those suffering spinal cord
injuries or serious burns, may experience shock, grief, pain, depres-
sion, and adverse psychological effects from powerful drugs.6 9 Some-
times such feelings can be effectively treated with "supportive psy-
chotherapy" or antidepressant drugs. 70 If these treatments are
66. See generally T. Szaz, LAW, LIBERTY & PSYCHIATRY (1963).
67. See, e.g., Jackson & Younger, Patient Autonomy and "Death with Dignity",
301 NEW ENG. J. MED. 404 (1979); Rodin, et al., supra note 30, at 542.
68. For example, in the Case of Elizabeth Bouvia, her attending physician during
the hearing, Psychiatrist Donald E. Fisher, argued that he believed that although Ms.
Bouvia was legally competent, she would change her mood and her mind given time
and resume eating. He accordingly felt justified in force feeding her with a nasogastric
tube, and forcing psychotropic medication on her because he believed that these were
life-saving procedures:
Q. To what extent is giving her psychotropic medication a life-saving
procedure?
A. It may affect her mood, her attitude, her motivation to live.
Q. Well, indeed, so might the surgical procedure/to improve her physical mo-
bility/ . . .Why is the surgical procedure different in your mind than the
psychotropic drugs . ..?
A. I think we are talking about two different periods of time. We are talking
about tube feeding, psychotropic drugs, the movement, part of a procedure
to keep a person alive. The orthopedic procedures, I think, are distant pro-
cedures and . . . could cover another time frame, another part of her life.
Questions from Attorney Richard Scott, Transcript 503-504. See generally, Annas,
The Case of Elizabeth Bouvia: When Suicide Prevention Becomes Brutality, 14 HAS-
TINGS CENTER REP. 20 (April 1984).
69. E.g., Gruzalski, supra note 2, at 172.
70. See examples in Appelbaum & Roth, supra note 31. In one case the authors
reported that a woman who had previously had her left leg amputated because of
vascular complications of diabetes refused to have her gangrenous right leg ampu-
tated as well. As in Candura, her physicians considered this decision "irrational."
After a psychiatric consultation, she was placed on antidepressant medication (it was
determined that she was depressed, but not incompetent) and changed her mind
shortly thereafter, but before the medication was likely to have had any effect. Her
"mood was clearly brighter.., she no longer wanted to die. . . she also spoke hope-
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indicated and not refused by the patient, it is certainly appropriate
to pursue them. On the other hand, if the competent patient refuses
such treatment and persists in a refusal of treatment, that refusal
should be honored. The relevant question is whether a mood such as
depression has become so severe as to undermine one's ability to
understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of his deci-
sions. If it has not, it alone does not justify a determination of
incompetence.
F. A Caveat
It has been noted that in some cases, such as troublesome or oth-
erwise undesirable patients, physicians may be too quick to accept a
refusal because they really do not want to treat the patient any-
way." In such cases, refusal may be taken at face value and used as
an excuse to abandon the patient when abandonment may be
neither justified morally nor consistent with the patient's legal
rights. Although the patient has a right to refuse treatment, it re-
mains the physician's legal responsibility to ensure that the patient
understands the consequences of that refusal. In a recent California
Supreme Court decision, 72 for example, a seemingly healthy young
woman refused her physician's recommendation that she be given a
PAP smear on two different occasions over a ten-year period. She
later developed cervical cancer and died. In a lawsuit brought by her
surviving children against the physician, the court held that the "fi-
duciary qualities" implicit in the doctor-patient relationship obli-
gated the physician to make sure that the refusal of an important,
recommended procedure was "informed." Thus, the court deter-
mined that the doctor had an obligation to discuss these potential
consequences of the patient's refusal of the tests with the patient.
7 3
In the coming era of Diagnostic Related Groups, managed health
care, and cost containment, health care providers may have a
financial incentive to terminate or not initiate expensive treat-
fully of learning to walk with artificial limbs." Id. at 433.
71. An example is provided by a 45-year-old man with a history of alcoholism
who was admitted to the hospital the day after Christmas for gastrointestinal bleed-
ing. He initially allowed the staff to use a nasogastric tube to lavage his stomach, but
pulled it out several times and ultimately refused to have it reinserted. He also re-
fused other procedures. The staff decided to transfer the patient, who resisted the
idea and checked out against medical advice. Id. at 446.
72. Truman v. Thomas, 27 Cal.3d 285, 611 P.2d 902, 165 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1980)
(en banc).
73. Id. at 294-95, 611 P.2d at 907-08, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 313-14.
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ment. 74 It is vital that such incentives not lead to uncritical accept-
ance of a patient's treatment refusal: promoting autonomy requires
us to ensure that decisions are based on informed consent.
G. Summary
Competence is primarily a fact question that can be answered
without reference to medical expertise. Properly understood, a rela-
tive, a friend, a nurse, or any other person familiar with the individ-
ual and the standard- of competence should be able to make a rea-
sonable assessment. This objectivity is important. On the other
hand, as a practical matter it will generally be the patient's attend-
ing physician who makes the initial assessment of competence.
Thus, it is essential that the physician understand the relevant test
so that it can be properly applied. Although there is probably no
ideal way to make a decision as potentially complex as the one with
which the physician is confronted, the physician must nonetheless
become comfortable with the fact that a truly autonomous decision
may not be synonymous with the medically-best decision, and that
this is not inharmonious with moral or societal values. What matters
most in making a decision about what will be done to the body of
another is that the values and will of the patient are honored. As H.
Tristram Englehardt has put it:
When the patient decides that the future quality of life open to him is
not worth the investment of pain and suffering to attain that future
quality of life, that is a decision proper to the patient ... one must
be willing, as a price for recognizing the freedom of others, to live with
the consequences of that freedom: some persons will make choices
that they would regret were they to live longer.
7
1
III. REAFFIRMING THE RIGHT TO REFUSE TREATMENT: A PROPOSED
MODEL ACT
Although the right of a competent adult to refuse treatment is
firmly entrenched in both common and constitutional law,76 cases
continue to recur in which individuals are treated despite their com-
74. See Brown, The Rationing of Hospital Care, in President's Commission for
the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research,
3 SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE 253-84 (1983).
75. Quoted in Gruzalski, supra note 2, at 174.
76. See supra notes 11-24 and accompanying text.
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petent objections or withdrawal of consent. 77 Because of this prob-
lem and the centrality of the right to refuse treatment to patient
autonomy, we believe it is appropriate for society periodically to re-
affirm its commitment to this principle. Indeed we believe that the
clear articulation of an individual's right to refuse medical treat-
ment is a proper subject for legislation. In addition, even though
presently competent patients may be afforded the right of refusal,
they may be treated after they become incompetent, even though
they might not have wished treatment in such circumstances. To
safeguard against treating previously competent individuals against
their will, many individuals and groups have proposed "living
wills" s7 8 in which an individual may set forth his treatment wishes in
77. E.g., Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), aff'd, 379
So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); Foster v. Tourtellotte, Order CV 81-5046-RMT (Mx) (C.D.
Cal. Nov. 16, 1981) (Takasugi, J.); In re Lydia E. Hall Hosp., 116 Misc. 2d 477, 455
N.Y.S. 2d 706 (Sup. Ct. 1982).
78. See, e.g., Concern for Dying, a New York-based educational organization
which has distributed more than 5 million copies of the "living will" in the past 15
years. The rationale of the living will is that, with the advent of more effective medi-
cal technology, patients may have their lives prolonged painfully, expensively, fruit-
lessly and against their wills. By signing a prior statement, the patient hopes to avoid
a technological imperative which commands that which can be done must be done,
and instead keep some control over medical treatment decisions. The organization's
most recent version of the living will (Sept. 1983) is as follows:
To My Family, My Physician, My Lawyer
and All Others Whom It May Concern
Death is as much a reality as birth, maturity and old age-it is the one cer-
tainty of life. If the time comes when I can no longer take part in decisions for
my own future, let this statement stand as an expression of my wishes and
directions, while I am still of sound mind.
If at such a time the situation should arise in which there is no reasonable
expectation of my recovery from extreme physical or mental disability, I direct
that I be allowed to die and not be kept alive by medications, artificial means
or "heroic measures." I do, however, ask that medication be mercifully admin-
istered to me to alleviate suffering even though this may shorten my remaining
life.
This statement is made after careful consideration and is in accordance with
my strong convictions and beliefs. I want the wishes and directions here ex-
pressed carried out to the extent permitted by law. Insofar as they are not
legally enforceable, I hope that those to whom this Will is addressed will re-
gard themselves as morally bound by these provisions.
Optional proxy statement: I hereby designate - to make treatment deci-
sions for me in the event I am comotose or otherwise unable to make such
decisions for myself.
Possible additional provisions are:
1. Measures of artificial life-support in the face of impending death that I
specifically refuse are:
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the event he later becomes incompetent and thus unable to speak
for himself. More than a dozen states have passed living will or
"death with dignity" legislation. 9 This movement underlines the se-
a) Electrical or mechanical resuscitation of my heart when it has
stopped beating.
b) Nasogastric tube feeding when I am paralyzed or unable to take
nourishment by mouth.
c) Mechanical respiration when I am no longer able to sustain my own
breathing.
2. I would like to live out my last days at home rather than in a hospital if it
does not jeopardize the chance of my recovery to a meaningful and sentient life
or does not impose an undue burden on my family.
3. If any of my tissues are sound and would be of value as transplants to
other people, I freely give my permission for such a donation.
79. Although specific provisions of these statutes vary, a typical statute allows
patients to authorize the withholding or withdrawal of medical treatment in the event
the patient becomes terminally ill. Most current "living will" statutes basically permit
physicians to honor a terminally ill patient's directive not to be treated if the physi-
cian agrees that treatment is not indicated. This, of course, can be done in the ab-
sence of any statute; and the current statutes do not so much enhance patients' rights
as they enhance provider rights (i.e., the physicians typically are granted immunity if
they follow the provisions of the statute). See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to 22-8A-10
(Supp. 1981); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-3081 to 82-3804 (Supp. 1981); CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE] §§ 7185-7195 (DEERING SUPP. 1982); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2421 to 2430
(Supp. 1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501 - 2509 (1982); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4501 to
39-4508 (Supp. 1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28, 101 to 65-28, 109 (Supp. 1981); NEv.
REV. STAT. §§ 449.540 - 449.690 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 to 24-7-11 (1981);
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320 to 90-322 (1981); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 97.050 - 97.090 (1981);
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h §§ 1-11 (Vernon 1982); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. §§
5251-5262 (1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.010 - 70.122.905 (West 1982). See
generally G. J. ANNAS, L.H.GLANTZ, B.F. KATZ, THE RIGHTS OF DOCTORS, NURSES, AND
ALLIED HEALTH PROFESSIONALS 220-23 (1981); G. Grisez, J.M. Boyle, LIFE AND DEATH
WITH LIBERTY AND JUSTICE 223-43 (1980); KEYSERLINGK, SANCTITY OF LIFE OR QUALITY
OF LIFE (1981); R. VEATCH, DEATH, DYING AND THE BIOLOGICAL REVOLUTION 199-201
(1976); Beraldo, Give Me Liberty and Give Me Death: The Right to Die and the
California Natural Death Act, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 971 (1980); Dickens, The
Right to Natural Death, 26 McGILL L.J. 847 (1981); Hand, Death with Dignity and
the Terminally Ill: The Need for Legislative Action, 4 NOVA L.J. 257 (1980); Havens,
In re Living Will, 5 NOVA L.J. 446 (1981); Kaplan, Euthanasia Legislation: A Survey
and a Model Act, 2 AM. J. LAW & MED. 41 (1976); Kite, The Right to Die a Natural
Death and the Living Will, 13 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 99 (1982); Kutner, The Living
Will: Coping with the Historical Event of Death, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 39 (1975); Kut-
ner, Due Process of Euthanasia: The Living Will, a Proposal, 44 IND. L.J. 539-54
(1969); Stephenson, The Right to Die: A Proposal for Natural Death Legislation, 49
U. CIN. L. REV. 228 (1980); Walters, The Kansas Natural Death Act, 19 WASHBURN
L.J. 519(1980); Law Reform Comm. of Canada, Euthanasia, Aiding Suicide and Ces-
sation of Treatment (Working Paper 28) (1982); Yale Law School Model Bill, in So-
CIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE LEGISLATIVE HANDBOOK 23-26 (1981).
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riousness of the public sentiment in this area. Nonetheless, we be-
lieve most of the recently passed and debated proposals are too nar-
row and limited, and that right to refuse legislation designed to
enhance patient autonomy:
* should not be restricted to the terminally ill, but should apply to all
competent adults and mature minors;
* should not limit the types of treatment an individual can refuse
(e.g., to "extraordinary" treatment) but should apply to all medical
interventions;
* should permit individuals to designate another person to act on
their behalf and set forth the criteria under which the designated per-
son is to make decisions;
* should require health care providers to follow the patient's wishes
and provide punishment for those who do not; and
* should require health care providers to continue to provide pallia-
'tive care to patients who refuse other intervention.
The Model Legislation
The specific provisions of our proposal are set forth in the Ap-
pendix to this article. The model proposed was developed by the
Legal Advisers of Concern for Dying.80 The Model Act has already
been introduced into the Florida legislature and has won the critical
acclaim of the President's Commission. The Commission has stated:
"In terms of its treatment of such central issues as the capacity to
consent and the standard by which a proxy decisionmaker is to act,
the Right to Refuse Treatment Act is carefully crafted and in con-
formity with the Commission's conclusions."'I Many sections of the
80. The Legal Advisers Committee of Concern for Dying was formed in 1980 and
took on the development of a model bill as one of its first projects. In addition to the
authors of this article, who are chairman & research assistant respectively, the com-
mittee consists of lawyers from across the United States and others involved in the
drafting of the model bill. Members included Leonard H. Glantz (Boston U. School of
Public Health); Barbara F. Katz (U. Massachusetts Medical Center); Margaret Som-
erville (McGill Law School); J. Dinsmore Adams (New York); C. Dickerman Williams
(New York); Richard Scott (Los Angeles); Jane Greenlaw (U. of Rochester, NY);
Kenneth Wing (U. No. Carolina Law School); Joseph Healey (U. Connecticut Medical
School) and John Robertson (U. Texas Law School). The Committee met approxi-
mately every six months over a three year period, and their model bill was adopted
by the Board of Directors of Concern for Dying in January, 1983 and published in 73
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 918 (1983).
81, President's Commission For The Study of Ethical Problems In Medicine And
Biomedical And Behavioral Research, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREAT-
MENT 148 (1983). The Commission did add, however, that they believed "[g]reater
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Act are self-explanatory, but some merit additional comment. No
specific form or document is included because we believe the indi-
vidual's wishes will be more likely to be set forth if his own words
are used.
The right being reaffirmed is the right to refuse treatment im-
plicit in any meaningful concept of individual liberty. Living will
statutes, on the other hand, usually rely on a vaguely articulated
"right to die" which we believe has no legal pedigree."2 We include
both adults and mature minors in the purview of the act because we
believe minors who understand and appreciate the nature and con-
sequences of their actions should be afforded self-determination and
not forced to undergo medical treatment against their will.
The proposed Act is aimed at protecting the autonomy of not
only the terminally-ill patients, but also those who are not termi-
nally ill. All persons merit respect and autonomy. Moreover, if we do
not raise our sensitivity regarding respect for the nonterminal pa-
tient's right to autonomy, it is extremely unlikely that the rights of
terminal patients will be respected. The Act also applies to patients
like Karen Ann Quinlan who, although in a hopeless, persistent veg-
etative state, do not suffer from an underlying, terminal illness.
The most critical definition in the Act is that of "competence"
and a determination of competence should be made in a manner
consistent with that discussed in Part II of this article. The Presi-
dent's Commission. noted that "by combining a proxy directive with
specific instructions, an individual could control both the content
and the process of decision-making about care in case of incapac-
ity."8 3 Our proposal incorporates this suggestion by permitting the
declarant to both define what interventions are refused, and to name
an authorized individual to make decisions consistent with his
desires as expressed in the declaration.' The Act recognizes that
opportunity for review of determinations of incompetency and of proxy's decisions
may be needed ... to protect patients' self-determination and welfare." Id. It is our
hope that this article will serve to address this concern of the Commission's.
82. The "right to die" was essentially the right Ms. Bouvia asserted in seeking a
court injunction to forbid the medical staff from force feeding her while she starved
herself to death in the hospital. See supra notes 6, 39, 61, and 68.
83. 1 MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 13, at 159.
84. Existing durable power of attorney statutes are collected in 1 MAKING
HEALTH CARE DECISIONS, supra note 13, at 155-60. Their problems are discussed in
Legal Problems of the Aged and Infirm-the Durable Power of Attorney-Planned
Protective Services and the Living Will, 13 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE & TRUST 1
(1978). To clarify the application of the durable power of attorney to medical treat-
ment decisions, California has recently amended its durable power of attorney stat-
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some providers may have different belief systems than the people
they care for as patients, and attempts to outline a realistic transfer
procedure which respects the ethical views of both parties. The Act
also recognizes, however, that the patient is most immediately af-
fected by the treatment-refusal decision, since the patient's own fu-
ture and quality of life are at stake. Consequently, when a patient's
directive and a provider's views differ, the patient's directive must
prevail over the physician's views in the rare occasions where trans-
fer is impossible.8 5
Providers who follow the procedures outlined in this Act are re-
lieved of liability under any civil, criminal, or administrative action.
ute, and it is likely that other states will follow California's lead. One would also be
obligated to respect the patient's prior directive regarding the withholding of IV or
nasogastric feeding under the Act. The law on withholding nutrition from an incom-
petent patient is currently ambiguous. See Annas, Nonfeeding: Lawful Killing in
California, Homicide in New Jersey, 13 HASTINGS CENTER RPT. 19 (Dec. 1983) for a
discussion of the cases of In re Conroy, supra note 10, currently on appeal to New
Jersey Supreme Court and Barber & Nejdl v. Superior Ct., 2 Civil No. 69350, 69351
(Ct. of App. 2d Dist., Div. 2, Oct. 12, 1983) (among the issues are whether feeding, by
whatever means, is properly considered a medical "treatment"). Even under the Act,
prisoners would not be permitted to starve themselves to death for political or per-
sonal motives not related to their medical conditions. See Annas, Prison Hunger
Strikes: Why Motive Matters, 12 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 21 (Dec. 1982) for a discus-
sion of the four cases that exist on this issue: Zant v. Prevatte, 248 Ga. 832, 286
S.E.2d 715 (1982) (right to privacy includes right of a competent prisoner to starve
himself to death); Von Holden v. Chapman, 87 A.D.2d 66, 450 N.Y.S. 2d 623 (App.
Div. 1982) (state has a compelling interest to prevent suicide); White v. Narick, 292
S.E. 2d 54 (W. Va. 1982) (state has a compelling interest in preserving life); and Com-
missoner v. Meyers, 399 N.E. 2d 452 (Mass. 1979) (state can force prisoner to obtain
kidney dialysis where motivation is to manipulate his placement in the prison system
because of its compelling interest in upholding orderly prison administration).
85. This may at first seem harsh, but we believe that the balance between the
physician's personal ethics or the ethics of the medical profession, and the liberty
interest of the patient will always be tipped by the patient's interest in being free
from nonconsensual medical interventions. See, for example, the discussion of medi-
cal ethics as a "compelling state interest" by the Massachusetts Supreme Court in
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977), where
the court concludes that honoring a patient's refusal is consistent with prevailing
medical ethics, but even if it weren't: "if the doctrines of informed consent and right
of privacy have as their foundations the right to bodily integrity . . . and control of
one's own fate, then those rights are superior to the institutional considerations
[maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical profession]." Id. at -, 370
N.E.2d at 417. Under this Act, for example, if the physicians at Riverside General
Hospital could not transfer Ms. Bouvia or find a physician there who would continue
caring for her without forcing feeding by I.V.'s or a nasogastric tube, they would be
obligated to respect her refusals of these interventions. See supra notes 6-8 and ac-
companying text.
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On the other hand, providers who abandon their patients or refuse
to comply with valid declarations are subject to punishment. These
offenders may face civil actions including charges of negligence and
battery. Administrative sanctions may include license revocation,
suspension or other disciplinary action by the state board of profes-
sional registration.
Other important sections of the Act make it clear that this
method of refusing treatment is not exclusive, but in addition to any
other methods recognized by law, that the refusal of treatment is
not suicide, that a treatment refusal does not affect any insurance
policy, and that regardless of refusals, palliative care must be given
unless specifically refused by the patient himself.8 6
The Act is designed to promote the autonomy of competent
adults and respect for their persons by enhancing the adults' right
to accept or reject medical treatments recommended by their health
care providers. It protects all patients who were once competent,
both while they are competent and when they execute a declaration
after they become incompetent. It provides that patients may exe-
cute a written, signed declaration setting forth their intentions on
treatment and refusal decisions and permits patients to designate
authorized individuals to make treatment decisions on their behalf
should they become incompetent in the future. The Act upholds and
clarifies recognized patient rights consistent with the ethics of the
medical profession and shields complying physicians, witnesses, and
authorized persons acting in good faith, from liability. In addition,
the Act provides sanctions for those who violate its provisions.
86. There is no time limit to the validity of declarations, just as there is no time
limit on ordinary wills or on donations made under Uniform Anatomical Gift Acts.
The primary protection regarding the wishes of a person is the requirement for two
witnesses to certify that they believe the person understood what he was signing and
did it voluntarily. We have not restricted the individuals who can be either witnesses
or authorized persons (e.g. to exclude the attending physician or relative who might
benefit under a will) because we think this unnecessarily implies bad faith on the part
of categories of individuals and unnecessarily restricts the autonomy of a person to
pick his own proxy and witnesses. A second protection for the declarant is that revo-
cation is made easy. But the intent to revoke must be specific. Merely signing a blan-
ket hospital admissions form that "consents" to whatever treatment physicians at the
hospital wish to render is insufficient indication of revocation of a declaration. While
a relative may sabotage a patient's wishes, the Act relies on good faith and criminal




The rights of privacy and self-determination in medical care
hinge upon the doctrine of informed consent. This doctrine is based
on the notion that an individual's consent must be competent, vol-
untary, and informed. Competence, the ability to understand and
appreciate the nature and consequences of one's decision, is the sine
qua non of autonomy in the medical setting. While "understanding"
has never been explicitly required prior to consent to a medical pro-
cedure, when competence is questioned, the best way to test it is to
determine whether or not the patient actually understands the ma-
terial information required to make his decision "informed." This
test of competence is objective and enhances the patient's central
role in medical decision-making about his own body. If we take con-
sent seriously, we must permit the competent, voluntary, informed
and understanding refusal of consent to stand as well; otherwise the
entire concept of liberty in health care becomes hollow.
. Some of the most difficult problems are confronted when we are
no longer able to communicate our wishes to our care givers. By pro-
posing model legislation that permits individuals to express their
wishes for treatment in a declaration that is binding upon their care
givers after the patient becomes incompetent, we enhance liberty
and make it more likely that individuals will be treated in ways con-
sistent with their own values rather than according to the value of
others. Had Dr. Barney Clark signed such a document prior to the
implantation of his artificial heart, for example, we would all have
been much more comfortable in knowing that his wishes regarding
the additional surgeries he endured were being followed. Without
such documentation, we are left with the uncomfortable feeling that
at some point Dr. Clark lost his human identity, and instead of the
artificial heart being a means to keep him alive, he became a means
to keep the artificial heart alive.
8 7
Unusual for its drama and expense, Dr. Clark's experience re-
lates to all of our potential medical experiences. How can we help
insure that we do not lose our human individuality, our "right to
privacy", in the face of medical technology designed to "save" us?
Without pretending to answer this difficult question, we suggest that
individual liberty will stand a better chance of surviving in the hos-
87. Dr. Clark acknowledged this in a videotaped interview with his surgeon. Dr.
DeVries. Dr. DeVries asked: "It's been hard for you, hasn't it Barney?" Dr. Clark
replied: "Yes, its been hard, but the heart itself has pumped right along, I think its
doing well." N.Y. Times, March 3, 1983, at 1, col. 8 (emphasis supplied).
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pital environment if competence determinations are better under-
stood and competent treatment refusals are honored.
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APPENDIX
RIGHT TO REFUSE TREATMENT ACT
Section 1. Definitions
"Competent person" shall mean an individual who is able to un-
derstand and appreciate the nature and consequences of a decision
to accept or refuse treatment.
"Declaration" shall mean a written statement executed according
to the provisions of this Act which sets forth the declarant's inten-
tions with respect to medical procedures, treatment or nontreat-
ment, and may include the declarant's intentions concerning pallia-
tive care.
"Declarant" shall mean an individual who executes a declaration
under the provisions of this Act.
"Health care provider" shall mean a person, facility or institu-
tion licensed or authorized to provide health care.
"Incompetent person" shall mean a person who is unable to un-
derstand and appreciate the nature and consequences of a decision
to accept or refuse treatment.
"Medical procedure or treatment" shall mean any action taken
by a physician or health care provider designed to diagnose, assess,
or treat a disease, illness, or injury. These include, but are not lim-
ited to, surgery, drugs, transfusions, mechanical ventilation, dialysis,
resuscitation, artificial feeding, and any other medical act designed
for diagnosis, assessment or treatment.
"Palliative care" shall mean any measure taken by a physician or
health care provider designed primarily to maintain the patient's
comfort. These include, but are not limited to, sedatives and pain-
killing drugs; non-artificial, oral feeding; sucti6n; hydration; and hy-
gienic care.
"Physician" shall mean any physician responsible for the declar-
ant's care.
Section 2.
A competent person has the right to refuse any medical proce-
dure or treatment, and any palliative care measure.
Section 3.
A competent person may execute a declaration directing the
withholding or withdrawal of any medical procedure or treatment or
any palliative care measure, which is in use or may be used in the
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future in the person's medical care or treatment, even if continuance
of the medical procedure or treatment could prevent or postpone
the person's death from being caused by the person's disease, illness
or injury. The declaration shall be in writing, dated and signed by
the declarant in the presence of two adult witnesses. The two wit-
nesses must sign the declaration, and by their signatures indicate
they believe the declarant's execution of the declaration was under-
standing and voluntary.
Section 4.
If a person is unable to sign a declaration due to a physical im-
pairment, the person may execute a declaration by communicating
agreement after the declaration has been read to the person in the
presence of the two adult witnesses. The two witnesses must sign
the declaration, and by their signatures indicate the person is physi-
cally impaired so as to be unable to sign the declaration, that the
person understands the declaration's terms and that the person vol-
untarily agrees to the terms of the declaration.
Section 5.
A declarant shall have the right to appoint in the declaration a
person authorized to order the administration, withholding, or with-
drawal of medical procedures and treatment in the event that the
declarant becomes incompetent. A person so authorized shall have
the power to enforce the provisions of the declaration and shall be
bound to exercise this authority consistent with the declaration and
the authorized person's best judgment as to the actual desires and
preferences of the declarant. No palliative care measure may be
withheld by an authorized person unless explicitly provided for in
the declaration. Physicians and health care providers caring for in-
competent declarants shall provide such authorized persons all med-
ical information which would be available to the declarant if the de-
clarant were competent.
Section 6.
Any declarant may revoke a declaration by destroying or defac-
ing it, executing a written revocation, making an oral revocation, or





A competent person who orders the withholding or withdrawal of
treatment shall receive appropriate palliative care unless it is ex-
pressly stated by the person orally or through a declaration that the
person refuses palliative care.
Section 8.
This act shall not impair or supersede a person's legal right to
direct the withholding or withdrawal of medical treatment or proce-
dures in any other manner recognized by law.
Section 9.
No person shall require anyone to execute a declaration as a con-
dition of enrollment, continuation, or receipt of benefits for disabil-
ity, life, health or any other type of insurance. The withdrawal or
withholding of medical procedures or treatment pursuant to the pro-
visions of this Act shall not affect the validity of any insurance pol-
icy, and shall not constitute suicide.
Section 10.
This Act shall create no presumption concerning the intention of
a person who has failed to execute a declaration. The fact that a
person has failed to execute a declaration shall not constitute evi-
dence of that person's intent concerning treatment or nontreatment.
Section 11.
A declaration made pursuant to this Act, an oral refusal by a
person, or a refusal of medical procedures or treatment through an
authorized person, shall be binding on all physicians and health care
providers caring for the declarant.
Section 12.
A physician who fails to comply with a written or oral declara-
tion and to make necessary arrangements to transfer the declarant
to another physician who will effectuate the declaration shall be
subject to civil liability and professional disciplinary action, includ-
ing license revocation or suspension. When acting in good faith to
effectuate the terms of a declaration or when following the direction
of an authorized person appointed in a declaration under Section 5,
no physician or health care provider shall be liable in any civil, crim-
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inal, or administrative action for withholding or withdrawing any
medical procedure, treatment, or palliative care measure. When act-
ing in good faith, no witness to a declaration, or person authorized
to make treatment decisions under Section 5, shall be liable in any
civil, criminal, or administrative action.
Section 13.
A person found guilty of willfully concealing a declaration, or fal-
sifying or forging a revocation of a declaration, shall be subject to
criminal prosecution for a misdemeanor [the class or type of misde-
meanor is left to the determination of individual state legislatures].
Section 14.
Any person who falsifies or forges a declaration, or who willfully
conceals or withholds information concerning the revocation of a
declaration, with the intent to cause a withholding or withdrawal of
life-sustaining procedures from a person, and who thereby causes
life-sustaining procedures to be withheld or withdrawn and death to
be hastened, shall be subject to criminal prosecution for a felony
[the class or type of felony is left to the determination of individual
state legislatures].
Section 15.
If any provision or application of this Act is held invalid, this
invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of the Act
which can be given effect without the invalid provision or applica-
tion, and to this end the provisions of this Act are severable.
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